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NOTES
Commercial Transactions: UCC § 2-719: Remedy
Limitations and Consequential Damage Exclusions
In today's typical sale of goods contract, a seller will likely include and
a buyer will likely accept what has been called a "four-step" warranty.' Ac-
cording to one scholar, a "four-step" warranty is one which unfolds as follows:
1. Seller makes an express warranty that the goods are free from defects
in material and workmanship;
2. Seller disclaims all other warranties, express or implied;
3. Upon breach of express warranty, Seller agrees to repair the goods or
replace defective parts as the exclusive remedy for breach of warranty; and
4. Seller attempts to exculpate itself from any liability for consequential
damages.'
This type of warranty is clearly permissible under the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC or the Code).' A seller may disclaim all warranties other than
the ones expressly stated," and he may disclaim all implied warranties, in-
1. Speidel, "Warranty Disclaimers and Limitations of Liability," at 141. Paper presented
at UCC Seminar in Knoxville, Tenn. (June 11, 1977).
2. Id. An example of this type of warranty reads as follows: John Doe Corporation warrants:
(I) John Doe Corporation has title to the equipment and the right to convey title to Customer;
and (2) for a period of one year from shipment, the equipment shall be free from defects in
material and workmanship under normal use and service.
Written notice and an explanation of the circumstances of any claim that the equipment has
proved defective in material or workmanship shall be given promptly by Customer to John Doe
Corporation. Customer's sole and exclusive remedy in the event of defect is expressly limited
to the correction of the defect by adjustment, repair, or replacement at John Doe Corporation's
election and sole expense, except that there shall be no obligation to replace or repair items
which by their nature are expendable.
No representation or other affirmation of fact, including but not limited to statements regarding
capacity, suitability for use, or performance of the equipment, shall be or be deemed to be a
warranty or representation by John Doe Corporation for any purpose, nor give rise to any liability
or obligation of John Doe Corporation whatsoever.
EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT, THERE ARE NO
OTHER WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL JOHN DOE CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR LOSS
OF PROFITS, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR OTHER SIMILAR DAMAGES
ARISING OUT OF ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT OR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE AGREEMENT.
3. The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in whole or in part by all fifty states
and the Virgin Islands; it is found at 12A OriA. STAT. §§ 1-101 to 11-107 (1981).
4. U.C.C. § 2-316(1), which provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this article on parol
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cluding the implied warranty of merchantability if it mentions merchanta-
bility and is conspicuous, and the implied warranty of fitness if it is in writing
and is conspicuous.' Further, a seller may limit the buyer's remedy for a breach
of warranty to repair or replacement of the nonconforming goods.6 If the limited
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, then it is the sole remedy of the
buyer.' Finally, the seller may exclude all consequential damages to the ex-
tent the exclusion is not unconscionable.'
However, what happens in the situation in which a buyer has agreed to
such provisions in his contract and the seller will not or cannot repair or replace
the nonconforming goods or parts, or is unable to fix them within a reasonable
time? Is the unfortunate buyer left with defective goods and no other recourse?
Never fear, the Code also provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive
or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as pro-
vided in this Act. ' 9 But when does a limited remedy fail of its essential pur-
pose? Of more importance to many sellers and buyers, what effect will such
a failure have on an independent consequential damage exclusion?
This note will analyze the situations in which an exclusive limited remedy
of repair or replacement fails of its essential purpose and the effect such a
failure has on otherwise valid warranty and damage disclaimers.
When a Limited Remedy of Repair or Replacement
Fails of Its Essential Purpose
Section 2-719 of the UCC'0 grants to contracting parties wide latitude in
fashioning their remedies in the event of a breach. As noted previously, the
parties must expressly agree that the remedies provided for in the contract
are the only remedies." This note will assume that the parties have done a
sufficiently satisfactory job in pleasing the idiosyncrasies of the particular court
in which they are litigating.
Although the parties may limit their remedies, it is axiomatic under the
Code that a party must be left with a "minimum adequate remedy" or a
or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
5. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), which states in pertinent part:
Subject to subsection [3] to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchant-
ability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty
of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous ....
6. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(A), which provides: "Mhe agreement... may limit or alter the measure
of damages recoverable under this article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to . . . repair
and/or replacement of non-conforming goods or parts."
7. U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(B), which specifies: "Resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy."
8. U.C.C. § 2-719(3), which provides in pertinent part: "Consequential damages may be
limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable."
9. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
10. See supra, notes 6, 7, 8.




fair "quantum of remedy." Official Comment One to section 2-719 provides:
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude
a contract for sale within this article they must accept the legal
consequence there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach
of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract. Thus any clause
purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions in an uncon-
scionable manner is subject to deletion.'"
Section 2-719(2) further provides: "where circumstances cause an exclusive
or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as
provided in this title."' 13 In attempting to explain this amorphous provision,
Official Comment One to section 2-719 provides: "Similarly, under subsection
(2), where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances
fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value
of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this
Article." I4
This comment makes clear that section 2-719(2) "is not concerned with
arrangements which were oppressive at their inception but rather with the
application of an agreement to novel circumstances not contemplated by the
parties."'' I Official Comment One is especially important in this area as courts
frequently resort to it when determining whether a particular limited remedy
has failed of its essential purpose.
A typical situation involving the issue of whether an exclusive limited remedy
of repair or replacement has failed of its essential purpose is the familiar
"lemon" automobile case. In this case, the buyer buys a new automobile that
the seller warrants will be free from defects in material and workmanship.
The sole remedy for the breach of the warranty is repair or replacement. The
car soon develops several defects that the seller either is unable to repair or
that take an exceedingly long time to repair. The buyer then sues for breach
of the warranty, alleging that the exclusive remedy has failed of its essential
purpose.
An example of such a case is the decision of Riley v. Ford Motor Co.'6
In Riley, the plaintiff purchased a new Ford automobile that soon developed
several defects.'7 After attempting to have his car fixed, Riley elected to sue
12. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Comment One.
13. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
14. Id., Official Comment One.
15. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW COMNm' FOR 1955, at 584.
16. 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971).
17. There was a noise in the rear end, a malfunctioning window, the air conditioning did
not work, the speed control did not function, the power seats became inoperative, the radio
aerial functioned spasmodically, the rear seat did not fit, the headlight panels were not synchronized,
the cigarette lighter was missing, the engine knocked, the windshield wipers did not work, the
transmission did not function properly, the gearshift lever would not function, and the left door
would not close properly.
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for breach of warranty and negligent repair. The contract between Riley and
Ford contained the basic warranty provisions.'8 In upholding the jury's finding
that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit set the tone for later decisions by relying heavily on Official
Comment One to section 2-719 and holding that to "enforce a limited remedy
under circumstances where repeated efforts failed to correct the defect would
deprive the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain."'' 9 The court further
stated:
We agree with the Appellee's contention that at some point after
the purchase of a new automobile, the same should be put in good
running condition, that is, the seller does not have an unlimited
time for the performance of the obligation to replace and repair
parts. This is no more than saying that at some point in time, it
must be obvious to all people that a particular vehicle simply can-
not be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free
from defect. [Citations omitted.]2'
Another typical "lemon" case is Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge- Winnebago
South.2' The fact pattern is familiar. Plaintiff purchased a motor home that
soon developed some twenty-one defects.2 Although Jacobs took the motor
home in for repairs several times, only some of the defects were repaired;
others were not, and still others appeared to be in worse condition after being
in the shop for repairs. The buyer, disgusted with the seller's inability to repair,
sued for revocation. However, the motor home was covered by two warranties
limiting the remedy to repair or replacement of the defective parts. In upholding
the jury's verdict that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose and
thus other remedies could be had, the Supreme Court of Minnesota enunciated
the general rule that
an exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose if circumstances
arise to deprive the limiting clause of its meaning or one party of
its substantial bargain. If the seller refuses to repair or replace within
a reasonable time, the buyer is deprived of the exclusive remedy.
Commendable efforts alone do not relieve a seller of his obliga-
tion to repair.23
Although the issue of when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose
arises most frequently in the consumer automobile cases, in recent years it
has also arisen in the commercial business context. Generally, the same analysis
prevails. In AES Technology Systems, Inc. v. Coherent Radiation,24 Coherent
18. 442 F.2d 670, 671 (5th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 673.
20. Id., n.5.
21. 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981).
22. Id. at 74.
23. Id. at 75.




sold AES a laser, warranting that the laser was to be free from defects in
materials and workmanship. The court found that Coherent had warranted
to AES that the laser was capable of producing 150 milliwatts in ultraviolet
mode. Coherent limited the remedy for breach of this warranty to repair and
replacement.2" AES experienced trouble with the laser from the beginning,
and after repeated efforts by Coherent were unsuccessful in bringing the laser
up to the warranted specifications for other than short periods of time, AES
sued Coherent for breach of warranty. In its decision, the court noted that
by limiting the warranties and remedies available for breach of warranty,
parties are able to provide a consensual allocation of risk in accordance with
sound business practices, and thus AES could not say it was not bound by
its terms.26
However, the court further noted that no contract may deprive parties of
minimum adequate remedies under the UCC, and stated:
In a case such as this, the warranty and remedy, while distinct,
go hand-in-hand. In a properly functioning system, a defect is
noticed (a small breach of warranty) and the repair or replacement
is quickly made (the remedy). Within a reasonable period of time
and after a reasonable number of failures, the steady-state perfor-
mance should be reached whereby the product performs as
specified. If after repeated efforts by a seller to place a product
into warranted condition, and the seller cannot or will not do so,
the remedy of repair or replacement may be deemed to have failed
of its essential purpose and other remedies under U.C.C. may be
called into play. 7
Thus, the court held that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose
because Coherent was unsuccessful, after repeated efforts, in bringing the laser
to warranted specifications, and during the ten months that AES owned the
laser, the laser had only sporadically performed as specified and warranted.
These cases illustrate the basic analysis used in determining whether a limited
remedy has failed of its essential purpose. Almost uniformly,28 the courts have
utilized analyses demonstrated by Riley, Jacobs, and AES.
29
25. Id. at 938.
26. Id. at 939.
27. Id.
28. For cases that deviate from this analysis, see Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Machine
Co., 65 Mich. App. 426, 237 N.W.2d 488 (1975); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1,
321 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(no writ); Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. Other representive cases using these analyses include Delhome Indus., Inc. v. Houston
Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1982); Chatlos Systems, Inc., v. National Cash Register
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Intern, 587 F.2d 1363 (9th
Cir. 1978); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Beal v. General
Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Custom Automated Machine v. Penda Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Office Supply Co. v. Basic Four Corp., 536 F. Supp. 766
(E.D. Wis. 1982); Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979);
19831
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The general rules may be summarized as follows. When a seller limits his
remedy to repair or replacement and the goods develop various defects the
seller either is unable to or will not repair, or does eventually repair the goods
and place them into warranted condition but does so in an unreasonable time,3"
then the limited remedy of repair or replacement will probably be deemed
to have failed of its essential purpose. In other words, if the seller does not,
within a reasonable time, give the buyer goods that are substantially free from
defects or in warranted condition, then the buyer will have been deprived
of the substantial value of his bargain and the courts will find that the remedy
has failed. Although seller's good faith in trying to place the goods in
conformity with the contract is a factor in this determination, it alone will
not shelter the seller from his obligation to repair. One reason the courts use
this analysis is that "when the parties conclude a contract for sale within article
two they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum
of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.""
If the buyer is left with defective goods, the courts simply feel that there is
not a "fair quantum of remedy."
Although this proposition is basically sound, it is limited in two important
respects. First, the logical starting point in determining whether a limited
remedy has failed of its essential purpose is to ascertain precisely the purpose
of the limited remedy. This is not done by most courts. The basic purpose
of a limited remedy may be summarized as follows:
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair
of defective parts, whose presence constitute a breach of an express
warranty, is to give the seller an opportunity to make the goods
conforming while limiting the risks to which he is subject by
excluding direct and consequential damages that might otherwise
arise. From the point of view of the buyer the purpose of the
exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract
within a reasonable time after a defective part is discovered. When
the warrantor fails to correct the defect as promised within a
reasonable time he is liable for a breach of that warranty ...
The limited, exclusive remedy fails of its purpose and is thus avoided
under § 2-719(2), whenever the warrantor fails to correct the defect
within a reasonable period.
3 2
Kohienberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1974); Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 919
(N.C. App. 1980); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157 (S.D. 1975); Moore v.
Howard Pontiac Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1972); Murray v. Holiday Rambler,
Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 165 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
30. What constitutes a reasonable time is governed by U.C.C. § 1-204(2), which provides:
"What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances
of such action."
31. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Comment One.




Any complete analysis of this issue should begin by ascertaining the essential
purpose of the limited remedy.
Second, although the above standard is usually "a sufficiently subjective
standard to allow the courts a quantum of discretion in determining the
continued validity of remedy limitations,' 33 it is not as flexible as it might
be in covering unique situations. These situations occur in the commercial
setting where the goods are either highly sophisticated and complex, or by
their nature experimental, and parties of relatively equal bargaining power
have freely negotiated an allocation of their risk of loss. A more complete
analysis should include the several rules summarized earlier, in addition to
the use of several factors suggested in J. A. Jones Construction Co. v. City
of Dover .3 These factors include: "the facts and circumstances surrounding
the contract, the nature of the basic obligations of the party, the nature of
the goods involved, the uniqueness or experimental nature of the items, the




By using these guidelines in addition to the tests set forth earlier, a court
is better able to handle the situations where parties of relatively equal
bargaining power have allocated their risks of loss in light of the complexity
and the experimental or unique nature of the goods, the unique facts or
circumstances that surround the contract, and the good faith and reasonable-
ness of the provisions included. Thus, if the buyer agreed to the exclusive
limited remedy as consideration for a lower price, a court should be more
hesitant to find a failure of the limited remedy. Likewise, if the goods are
highly sophisticated, experimental in nature, or in short supply, a limited
remedy should less likely fail of its essential purpose.
Nevertheless, whatever the standard used by a particular court, the lesson
is clear that "a limitation of remedy clause that takes too much away from
a buyer may give him everything."' 36 The seller should attempt to do three
things in order to avoid excessive liability.
First, the seller should offer an alternative remedy of refund in the event
it cannot repair or replace. This would allow the limited remedy to withstand
judicial scrutiny and allow the seller to avoid a consequential damages issue.
The success of such a provision can be found in the case of Marr Enterprises
v. Lewis Refrigerator Co.
3
1
A second solution would be for the contract to state that the limited remedy
provision and consequential damage disclaimer were given by the buyer in
consideration for certain other aspects of the contract, such as a low price,
unique or experimental goods, or other provisions favorable to the buyer.
33. Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure of Purpose: A Look at
Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977).
34. 372 A.2d 540 (Del. Super. 1976), app. dismissed 377 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977).
35. Id. at 549.
36. J. WHrrE & R. SUzMERS, UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 12-10, at 470 (1980).
37. 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977).
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By doing so, the parties have indicated that the provisions in the contract
were the result of bargaining and, consequently, a court should be hesitant
to find a failure of the limited remedy except in extreme circumstances. The
reason is obvious; where a buyer has received favorable provisions in
consideration for the limited remedy, the fewer the circumstances a court can
find that the buyer has been deprived of the substantial value of his bargain.
A final possible solution would be to include a provision in the contract
delineating precisely the purpose behind the exclusive remedy and further
stating that such remedy will not fail of its purpose if the seller is willing
and able to repair the goods in the prescribed manner. Such a provision would
force the courts to abide by the parties' contractual provisions and further
narrow the circumstances where a limited remedy can fail of its essential
purpose.
Effect of a Failure of Essential Purpose on
Otherwise Valid Warranty Disclaimers
If a court finds that an exclusive limited remedy of repair or replacement
has failed of its essential purpose, the question arises as to what effect such
a failure will have on otherwise valid warranty disclaimers.38 The answer
generally is and should be none.
Logically, a failure of essential purpose of a remedy should have no effect
on a disclaimer of a warranty. Limitation of remedies is governed by section
2-71931 of the Code, while disclaimer of warranties is governed by section
2-3164o of the Code. A limitation of remedy provision will not come into play
until there is a breach of warranty. If all implied and express warranties are
disclaimed, there can be no breach of warranty and therefore no liability may
arise. Thus, if in deciding whether there has been breach of warranty, a court
upholds the validity of the warranty disclaimers, there can be no breach other
than a breach of a warranty that goods will be free of defects in material
and workmanship. A failure of the essential purpose of the limited remedy
should have no aftereffect on the validity of the warranty disclaimers. As
one court has stated:
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a seller of goods may limit
his contractual liability in two ways. He may disclaim or limit his
warranties ... or he may limit the buyer's remedies for a breach
of warranty .... These methods are closely related and in many
cases their effect may be substantially identical. Conceptually,
however, they are distinct. A disclaimer of warranties limits the
seller's liability by reducing the number of circumstances in breach
of the contract; it precludes the existence of a cause of action. A
limitation of remedies, on the other hand, restricts the remedies
38. See supra note 2 for an example of such disclaimers.
39. See supra notes 5, 6, 7.
40. Supra note 4.
[Vol. 36
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available to the buyer once a breach is established. [Citations
omitted.]"
Further, as one court has noted, if not unconscionable, a party may disclaim
all warranties, thus insulating itself from all contractual liability." ' Any court
that holds that a failure of a limited remedy would nullify proper and valid
warranty disclaimers is attacking the problem backwards. A court must first
look at the warranties given, at whether the disclaimer of other warranties
was valid, and then find a breach of any warranty expressly given or not
properly disclaimed before it can even begin to analyze whether the limited
remedy has failed of its essential purpose.
Unfortunately, one case has held that where a limited remedy has failed
of its essential purpose, then all exclusions on the seller's warranties and
liabilities must be disregarded."3 In that case the court stated, without an iota
of logic or legal authority to support its proposition: "[W]e note that if
Plaintiffs are able to ... prove that the limited remedy has failed of its essen-
tial purpose the trial court could disregard not only the exclusion of conse-
quential damages but also the disclaimer of implied and other express
warranties.""
Failure of Essential Purpose and Its Effect on Otherwise
Valid Consequential Damage Exclusions
The most difficult and unsettled question is whether an independent, other-
wise valid consequential damages disclaimer" will stand or fall upon a failure
of essential purpose of a limited remedy. In other words, once a court finds
that an exclusive limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, may the
court then award consequential damages despite an otherwise conscionable
consequential damages disclaimer? It is submitted that the answer should be
no, and that a consequential damages disclaimer should be governed by its
own Code standard of unconscionability,6 independent of whether a limited
remedy has failed. There are two very good reasons for this result.
First, from the parties' standpoint the exclusion of consequential damages
may be the most significant limitation of liability in the contract. In the com-
mercial setting, potential liability for consequential damages" can be enormous
compared to other available remedies. Potential consequential damages may
and most often do exceed the value of the goods by an unknown quantum,
the amount depending not so much on the seller's activities or goods but on
the individual structure of the buyer and the buyer's contracts and his rela-
41. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978). See also
J. WmrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11, at 471-72 (1980).
42. Tuttle v. Kelley-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1978).
43. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978).
44. Id. at 802 n.14.
45. See supra note 2 for an example of such disclaimer.
46. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
47. Such damages are usually in the form of lost profits or resale of the goods in business.
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tionships with third parties. Thus, when parties of relatively equal bargaining
power freely negotiate and agree to an allocation of risk of consequential
damages to one party, this allocation should not be disturbed unless uncons-
cionable. Risk shifting is socially expensive and a court should not undertake
to shift a freely negotiated risk provided for in the contract in the absence
of good reason. Further, it is clear that the Code sanctions such an allocation
of risk in the area of consequential damages. Official Comment Three to sec-
tion 2-715 provides: "In the absence of excuse under the section on merchant's
excuse by failure of presupposed conditions, the seller is liable for consequential
damages .... Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of consequential
damages has available the section on contractual limitation of remedy.""' Also,
section 2-719 "recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding conse-
quential damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an uncons-
cionable manner. Actually such terms are merely an allocation of unknown
or undeterminable risks."49
The second reason that a failure of a limited remedy should not affect a
consequential damage disclaimer is that the two provisions are governed by
different sections of the Code. Limitation of remedies is governed by section
2-719(2),5 and damage exclusions are governed by section 2-719(3).' There
is a good reason for the separation. As one court has noted, comparing the
limited remedy clause with the damage exclusion clause is like comparing apples
with oranges.52 The limitation of remedy analysis is not concerned with
arrangements that were oppressive at their inception but is concerned with
novel circumstances not contemplated by the parties. On the other hand,
consequential damages disclaimers are permitted by section 2-719(3)" unless
unconscionable, i.e., oppressive at their inception. The determination of the
former is for the jury,5' while determination of the latter is a question for
the court.5 - Simply stated, the two provisions are materially different and
should be treated so, and the invalidity of one clause should have no effect
on the other. Three recent cases illustrate the above reasoning.
In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp. ,56 the court, in
upholding the damages disclaimer, reasoned as follows:
It appears to us that the better reasoned approach is to treat
the consequential damage disclaimer as an independent provision,
valid unless unconscionable. This poses no logical difficulties. A
contract may well contain no limitation on breach of warranty
damages but specifically exclude consequential damages. Con-
48. U.C.C. § 2-715, Official Comment Three (emphasis added).
49. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Comment Three (emphasis added).
50. See supra note 6.
51. See supra note 7.
52. Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981).
53. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
54. Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 239 (S.D. 1981).
55. Id. at 238. See U.C.C. § 2-302.
56. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 36
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versely, it is quite conceivable that some limitation might be placed
on a breach of warranty award, but consequential damages would
expressly be permitted.
The limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages
exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery for
breach of warranty. [Citations omitted.] The Code, moreover, tests
each by a different standard. The former survives unless it fails
of its essential purpose, while the latter is valid unless it is uncons-
cionable. We therefore see no reason to hold, as a general prop-
osition, that the failure of the limited remedy provided in the
contract, without more, invalidates a wholly distinct term in the
agreement excluding consequential damages. The two are not
mutually exclusive."
And, as the court stated in S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Intern, Inc.:
The issue remains whether the failure of the limited repair remedy
to serve its purpose requires permitting the recovery of consequen-
tial damages as sections 2714(3) and 2715 permit. We hold it does
not. In reaching this conclusion we are influenced heavily by the
characteristics of the contract between Smith and Wilson ....
Parties of relatively equal bargaining power negotiated an allocation
of their risks of loss. Consequential damages were assigned to the
buyer, Wilson. The machine was a complex piece of equipment
designed for the buyer's purposes. The seller Smith did not ignore
his obligation to repair; he simply was unable to perform it. This
is not enough to require that the seller absorb losses the buyer
plainly agreed to bear. Risk shifting is socially expensive and should
not be undertaken in absence of a good reason. An even better
reason is required when to so shift is contrary to a contract freely
negotiated. The default of the seller is not so total and fundamental
as to require that its consequential damage limitation be expunged
from the contract.58
In American Electric Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," the court,
in upholding the consequential damages disclaimer, noted that when an
exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose, it may be ignored, and other
clauses in the contract that limit remedies for breach may be left to stand
or fail independently of the stricken clause. The court made the following
observation:
Further, the rule that the agreed-upon allocation of commercial
risk should not be disturbed is particularly appropriate where, as
here, the warranted item is a highly complex, sophisticated, and
57. Id. at 1086.
58. 587 F.2d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978).
59. 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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in some ways experimental piece of equipment. Moreover, com-
pliance with a warranty to repair or replace must depend on the
type of machinery in issue. In the case of a multi-million dollar
turbine-generator, we are not dealing with a piece of equipment
that either works or does not, or is fully repaired or not at all.
On the contrary, the normal operation of turbine-generator spans
too large a spectrum for such simple characterizations.60
Although these results may seem harsh if applied to a consumer transaction,
as a practical matter the courts are much more inclined to find unconscion-
ability in the case of the downtrodden consumer than with the commercial
businessman who presumably has a far more meaningful choice.61
Despite the rather obvious differences between the two provisions, several
courts have held that when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose,
the full array of Code remedies apply, including consequential damages, despite
an otherwise valid damages disclaimer.6 2 Most of these courts rely on the
reasoning in the cases of Adams v. J. L Case Co.,63 and Jones & McKnight
Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp.6" In Adams, the court stated:
Had they reasonably complied with their agreement contained in
the warranty they would be in a position to claim the benefits of
their stated limited liability and to restrict plaintiff to his stated
remedy. The limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable
from the obligations of the warranty . . . . It should be obvious
that they cannot at once repudiate their obligation under their
warranty and assert its provisions beneficial to them. . . . It is
clear that an implied warranty for reasonably prompt and timely
repairs upon breach of the express warranty may arise under [UCC
2-316]. Though excluded by the written warranty as authorized in
60. Id. at 458. For other representive holdings that a consequential damages disclaimer
withstands the failure of a limited remedy, see V.M. Corp. v. Bernard Dist. Co., 447 F.2d 864
(7th Cir. 1971); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C.
1974), rev'd men. and remanded, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
Welding & Eng'g Co., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Office Supply Co. v. Basic Four
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp.
1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. App. 1980).
61. The buyer of a consumer product is also protected by the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1976).
62. For other cases holding an independent consequential damages disclaimer ineffective upon
the failure of the limited remedy, see Soo Line R.R. v. Fruhauf Corp., 542 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.
1977); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Custom Automated
Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kohlenberger Inc. v. Tyson's Foods,
Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1974); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d
71 (Minn. 1981); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Goddard
v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157 (S.D. 1975); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis.
1978).
63. 261 N.E.2d 1 (I11. 1970).




UCC Section 2-316, defendants' repudiation for failure to reason-
ably comply avoids the exclusion."5
The Jones court chose to follow Adams for the following reasons:
Although the plaintiff-buyer purchased and accepted the machinery
and equipment with the apparent knowledge that the seller had
properly limited its liability to repair or replacement, and although
plaintiff does not allege any form of unconscionability in the
transactions which led to the purchase, plaintiff also was entitled
to assume that defendants would not be unreasonable or wilfully
dilatory in making good their warranty in the event of defects in
the machinery and equipment. It is the specific breach of the
warranty to repair that plaintiff alleges caused the bulk of its
damages. This Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed
the defendant to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty
when it has allegedly repudiated and ignored its very limited obliga-
tions under another segment of the same warranty, which alleged
repudiation has caused the very need for relief which the defendant
is attempting to avoid. If the plaintiff is capable of sustaining its
burden of proof as to the allegations it has made, the defendant
will be deemed to have repudiated the warranty agreement so far
as restricting plaintiff's remedies, and the exclusive remedy provision
of the contract will be deemed under the circumstances to have
failed of its essential purpose, thus allowing plaintiff the general
array of remedies under the Code.
6
The results in these two cases are probably correct because in both cases
there was a willful refusal to perform. Where a willful refusal to perform
causes the consequential damages alleged, then the enforcement of such a
provision would be unconscionable. When the parties contracted and the risk
of consequential damages was allocated to the buyer, the seller promised to
repair or replace defective parts or nonconforming goods. Further, under the
Code, he was required to do so within a reasonable time" and thus would
have mitigated the consequential damages of the buyer. The buyer has not
agreed to assume liability for open-ended consequential damages, but only
those that occurred while the seller was attempting to put the goods in
conformity with the contract. Where it is the seller's willful conduct that causes
the consequential damages, it would be unconscionable to exclude the seller's
liability for these damages."
As the above analysis suggests, Jones and Adams were correctly decided
not because the limited remedy had failed of its essential purpose but because
65. 261 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (Ill. 1970).
66. 320 F. Supp. 39, 43-44 (N.D. I11. 1970).
67. U.C.C. § 2-309(1).
68. This causal distinction is made in respect to incidental damages by the buyer of a con-
sumer product in the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. 2304(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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the enforcement of consequential damages provision was unconscionable.
Nevertheless, several cases have jumped on the Adams and Jones bandwagon
despite the fact there was no willful failure to perform." These cases provide
three reasons to support their decision. The first is section 1-106 of the Code,'1
which provides that the remedies provided by the Code shall be liberally ad-
ministered. The second reason is that section 2-719(2) of the Code' provides
that where circumstances cause an exclusive remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this title. Finally, the courts are
relying on the Official Comment to section 2-719, which provides that all
parties must accept the legal consequence that there be a fair quantum of
remedy upon breach; where the exclusive remedy fails in its purpose or operates
to deprive a party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way
to the general remedy provisions of the Code."'
Thus, these courts hold that when the repair or replacement remedy failed,
everything connected with it failed as well. Unfortunately, as suggested above,
these courts are ignoring that the two clauses are materially different and are
governed by separate sections of the Code, and thus are disturbing freely
negotiated risk allocations without good reason.
Conclusion
Although the general rules concerning a limited remedy of repair and replace-
ment are reasonably well settled, the practitioner should be aware that whether
a particular limited remedy has failed depends upon a numberof considera-
tions. These considerations include the surrounding circumstances of the con-
tract, the nature of goods involved, the nature of the basic obligations of
the parties, the general availability of the items, the uniqueness or experimen-
tal nature of the items, and the good faith and reasonableness of the provisions.
Thus, as is readily apparent in all aspects of the law, the result of each case
will hinge on its own set of facts. If the limited remedy is found to have,-
failed of its essential purpose, such a failure will generally have no effect on
an otherwise valid warranty disclaimer.
However, the law is in a state of flux concerning the effect of a failure
of the limited remedy's essential purpose on a consequential damage disclaimer.
One line of cases holds that the disclaimer is ineffective, relying on the liberal
remedies of the Code, the explicit language of section 2-719(2), and Official
Comment One to section 2-719. The other line of cases analyzes the disclaimer
independent of the failure of the limited remedy and upholds the disclaimer,
unless unconscionable, reasoning that the limited remedy and consequential
damage provisions are governed by separate sections of the Code; the Code
specifically sanctions allocation of risk of loss of consequential damages; and
this allocation should not be disturbed unless unconscionable. The latter
reasoning is far more persuasive.
Eric Eissenstat
69. See supra note 62.
70. U.C.C. § 1-106.
71. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
72. Id., Official Comment One.
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